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LETTERS TO THE EDITORQuestioning the Limits
of Genomic Privacy
To the Editor: Recently, Im et al.1 presented a method that
can infer an individual’s participation in a study when
regression coefficients from quantitative phenotypes are
available. They demonstrated that in an era of increas-
ing use of high-throughput technologies to integrate
multiple-omics data sets, the ‘‘problem of identifiability’’
necessitates the creation of robust methods (e.g., an
annual certification process) that facilitate broad dis-
semination of study results without compromising a
participant’s privacy. In this letter, we would like to qualify
the conclusions of Im et al., and several other commenta-
tors,2–5 by illustrating that (1) despite the perceived ease
of reidentification, anonymity (and genomic privacy in
general, which subsumes anonymity and identifiability
as critical elements of informational control) remains
a valid and vital concept and (2) technologies and models
currently exist that facilitate dissemination of useful
health data without compromising privacy. We think
that the topic addressed by Im et al. is all the more critical
given that the European Union (EU), the United States
(US), and other jurisdictions are presently reforming their
privacy, data, and human subjects research protection
frameworks.
As policymakers, scientists, and the public grapple with
the growing data deluge and concerns about privacy,
a key issue will be to examine the legal definition of
‘‘personal data.’’ The EU’s newly proposed data protection
regulation defines personal data as ‘‘any information
relating to a data subject.’’ A data subject is an ‘‘identified
natural person’’ (i.e., a person whose identity data, such
as name, address, or birth date, are known) or a ‘‘natural
person who can be identified, directly or indirectly, by
means reasonably likely to be used by... [a]... person.’’6
A recent revision to the proposed regulation’s definition
of ‘‘personal data’’ adds that ‘‘[i]f identification requires a
disproportionate amount of time, effort, or material re-
sources, the natural living person shall not be considered
identifiable.’’7 In the US, according to the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), ‘‘indi-
vidually identifiable health information’’ is information
that identifies the individual or for which ‘‘there is a
reasonable basis to believe it can be used to identify the
individual.’’8
Neither the EU’s proposed data protection regulation nor
HIPAA provide definitions of ‘‘anonymous’’ or ‘‘anonym-
ization,’’ which have distinct technical meanings,9 but
nationally and internationally recognized definitions of
‘‘anonymous’’ exist, though they unfortunately continue
to lack terminological and technical standardization.3
For example, the EU’s Article 29 Working Party definesThe Americananonymous data as ‘‘any information relating to a... person
where the person cannot be identified... taking into
account all means reasonably likely to be used.’’10 To us,
this is a clear recognition of the concept and utility of
anonymous data. Yet, when it comes to biological data,
like DNA parameters, many believe that anonymity simply
no longer exists because the legal term ‘‘identifiable’’ seem-
ingly now applies to everyone because every ‘‘anonymous’’
or ‘‘anonymized’’ person can sooner or later be identified
by some technology and method.
This argument overlooks many critical points. First,
a biospecimen in itself does not contain identity data.
Even if it can be determined with a certain probability
that a biospecimen originates from a specific individual
bymatching DNA data, suchmatching is different from as-
sessing the identity of an individual.11,12 Furthermore, the
more uncertainty there is in determining data for reidenti-
fication, the more anonymous the data become; absent
true data authenticity, reidentification risks are mini-
mal.13 Even when reidentification on the basis of deidenti-
fied or anonymized biomedical data would be possible
because databases with voter registration data, hospital
discharge data, and court proceedings are accessible,
a survey showed that reidentification on the basis of prop-
erly ‘‘deidentified’’ (to say nothing of anonymous) data is
extremely difficult to achieve in practice.14,15 In sum,
lending unreasonable credibility to remote risks of reiden-
tification confuses multiple, justifiably separate legal defi-
nitions of ‘‘personal data,’’ ‘‘data subject,’’ ‘‘anonymous,’’
and ‘‘anonymized’’ and leads to a burdensome ‘‘gross over-
expansion of the [privacy] legal framework.’’16 This in turn
threatens the advancement of anonymity as a practical
concept, curtails beneficial uses of data, and reduces the
incentive to anonymize data or collect anonymous
data.17 In both science and in law, then, data anonymity
vitally remains an ongoing concern. Remote exceptions
cannot form the basis for a common rule. Data is not
‘‘personal’’ if ‘‘anonymous’’ or ‘‘anonymized.’’
Second, similar to our objections to those who treat all
data as ‘‘personal,’’ we think that there is a widespread
failure to accept the rapid technological progress being
made, particularly in genomics research and population
biobanking, to simultaneously protect an individual’s
privacy interests and promote scientific and biomedical
breakthroughs.18–20 Current practices such as data access
agreements already incorporate the annual certification
process that Im et al. propose.21 There are ample reasons
to move past the stale dichotomy and false choice of
privacy or data utility and to embrace the possibilities of
emerging technologies, processes, and projects. Far from
potentially harming participants and researchers, methods
and emerging technologies that work within a regulatory
framework or legislation demonstrate how anonymity
may facilitate innumerable benefits.Journal of Human Genetics 91, 577–579, September 7, 2012 577
Certainly privacy protection remains the most pressing
concernwithin the interface ofmedical research andpublic
participation. Indeed, there are areas that warrant greater
focus by the scientific community, such as group-based
privacy issues where, for example, ‘‘nontransparent alloca-
tion of individuals to groups based on known or inferred
traits or some combination thereof can raise issues related
to the ability to protect one’s own interest and avoid
discrimination.’’22 We share the concern of Im et al. and
others that as science and technology advance, the use of
additional human characteristics such as data will pose
challenges to privacy interests, which may need to be re-
conceptualized to remain relevant in 21st century science
and medicine. Yet, concerns regarding the ‘‘problem of
identifiability’’ as a veritable limit to genomic privacy
must be tempered with nuance. It is only through recogni-
tion and acceptance of the ongoing practical utility of data
anonymity, use of evidence to conclude that the risk of
reidentification is remote, and adoption of successful
emerging practices and technologies that we can achieve
a ‘‘win-win’’ situation. Anonymous and useful data can be
legally and ethically bridged while respecting the privacy
interests of individual participants, along with the biomed-
ical research interests of society as a whole.
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